DDZG 57-2377

30 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT

: Review of CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve

REFERENCE

: FRC Action No. DD/8 27-58, subject as above

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation under paragraph 8.

2. Objective

To establish a poel of civilian specialists required in event of emergency.

3. Pacts

- a. The Agency requires augmentation of existing force strength from sources other than the military in event of an emergency.
- b. A Task Force chaired by Office of Personnel determined that the requirement would be greatest in categories of critical technical personnel such as communications, medical, tests and measurements, investigators, interrogators, etc.
- e. The Offices of Communications and Training recommended establishment of a civilian reserve program.
- d. Task Force concluded such a program was feasible under Public Lev 110.
- e. The Civilian Specialist Reserve Program, prepared by Office of Personnel, was approved in principle by the Career Council, which recommanded it be presented to the Project Review Committee for approval as a pilot project.

4. Surrary of Project

- a. Authorization of 250 spaces with 50 spaces obligated the first year (FY 1958).
- b. Spaces allocated, program supervised, restuiting and administration handled by Office of Personnel in coordination with CIA claimant offices, Staffs and Divisions.

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- c. Prospects recruited from those having satisfied military training requirements.
- d. Members of reserve agree to two-week training period annually and to full duty in event of emergency, subject to the right of cameallation by either party with appropriate notification.
- e. Training of reservists would be formal, with on-the-job training provided only in carefully controlled instances. Orientation-type training will be the responsibility of the Office of Training, whereas specialised training will be the responsibility of the claimant Agency component. Training programs are not now developed.
- f. No additional CIA personnel would be required immediately but possible sugmentation may be required later as program takes form.
 - g. Duration of project is indefinite.

5. Funding

- a. Responsibility for funding pilot program is assumed to be that of Office of Personnel.
- b. The cost per year per reservist is estimated to be \$662. for the appointment year and \$526. thereafter.
 - c. Funds requested are as follow:

FY 1956 - \$33,100. for 50 reservists

FY 1959 - \$158,700. for 200 reservists

6. Comments

- a. The general premise that CIA will require augmentation of existing force strength from sources other than the military in event of an emergency is sound. The question is the procedure by which this can best be implemented.
- b. Although the most critical need foreseeable at this time may be for technical personnel, it would seem reasonable that the Agency will require executive and non-technical personnel augmentation.
- c. At present, only the Offices of Communications and Training have indicated a requirement for reserve-type personnel. There has been no determination of the over-all requirements of the Agency sugmentation needs.

- d. Seme consideration should be given to normal instability of younger personnal, since they generally are not completely set in their carears or avecations. This suggests a considerable turnover, abetted by the terms of the proposed agreement which enables easy abrogation. Also, the requirement that the prospect will have completed his military training requirements is substantially irrelevant to their use in time of emergency.
- e. The project, as now presented, essentially constitutes a concept as opposed to a program.

7. Pindines

- a. This is an old, often-tried program. So far no sound system has been developed. It seems to be generally agreed some system is needed to provide some type of "reserve" program.
- b. Briefly, I suggest that to be the right program the following questions must be answerable in the affirmative:
 - (1) Will we have control over these reservists?
 - (2) Will we actually get a minimum of 75% of those trained?
 - (3) Is there sufficient inducement in the program which will persuade an individual to join and stay in the program?
 - (4) Will the end product be worth the cost? (Conservative estimate one million dollars per 1,000 reservists mambers.)
 - (5) Will the program be more productive than depending on the Department of Defense?

8. Recommendations

a. That this program be placed on a trial basis, limited to 50 reservists for a period of two or more years to develop sufficient knowledge upon which to base a permanent plan.

b. Continue to seek a means to draw critical skilled personnel from the military in time of emergency.

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